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Abstract 
Open Systems and Evolutionary Acquisition are two recent innovations 
designed to improve program performance with flexibility. The full potential of these 
approaches has not been captured, partially because of integration challenges 
during implementation. The current work investigates the impacts of open systems 
and evolutionary acquisition on DoD development programs. Changes required to 
use both Open Systems and Evolutionary Acquisition are used to identify and 
describe impacts of implementation on program process and management. A 
dynamic simulation model of a program using both Evolutionary Acquisition and 
Open Systems is described and used to map the impacts. Simulation results 
generally support previously suggested impacts and provide a possible explanation 
for changes in program performance. Implications for practice relate to changes in 
the types and timing of risk and a potential trading of design obsolescence risk for 
standards obsolescence risk.  
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Introduction 
System interoperability and the incorporation of evolving technologies in 
major DoD systems are two important acquisition challenges that the military faces 
in preparing the warfighter to meet current and future capability demands. The use 
of legacy and other weapon platforms, joint service solutions, the information and 
communication needs of Network-centric Systems (NCS), and coordination with 
allies in joint operations each require the development of weapon systems that can 
operate across system, platform, and systems-of-systems boundaries. Past DoD 
acquisition approaches have not fully provided the interoperability needed to meet 
these demands. The continued, and in some cases accelerating, evolution of 
technologies creates new challenges that are difficult to forecast and require fast 
acquisition response. Integrated human-computer decision-making tools, advanced 
materials, NCS tools, and nano-level structures are examples of evolving 
technologies that present challenges and potential solutions that must be integrated 
by defense acquisition programs.   
Open systems (OSJTF, 2004, September) and evolutionary acquisition (DoD, 
2004, November, section 4.4.1) are two relatively recent DoD acquisition initiatives 
that seek to address system interoperability and technology evolution challenges 
and that help the DoD meet current and future capability needs. An open systems 
(OS) approach and evolutionary acquisition (EA) share several high-level objectives. 
Both approaches seek to improve performance over the system’s lifetime and 
reduce acquisition cycle-time. Both approaches also attempt to improve system 
performance via flexibility for the integration of new technologies and information into 
systems as they evolve. The open systems approach facilitates upgrades through 
modularity. EA does this by multiple product releases and deliberate deferral of 
some functionality—allowing technologies and requirements to evolve and mature. 
Both OS and EA seek to reduce acquisition cycle-time to provide currently available 
functionality. OS provide a means of incorporating current and future functionality, 
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and evolutionary acquisition limits the scope of develop blocks to only the 
technologies and capabilities that are attainable in the near future.  
Open systems and evolutionary acquisition share at least two important 
implementation approaches. First, both OS and EA incorporate flexibility into 
acquisition to manage uncertainty in technology. Open Systems build flexibility into 
development products with modular design and standardized key interfaces. 
Evolutionary acquisition builds flexibility into development processes through the 
design of incremental capability blocks. These flexibilities create options that 
potentially increase system performance, reduce cost, or both, by allowing 
technological uncertainties to partially resolve before important development 
decisions are made. Second, both OS and EA place emphasis upon interfaces to 
address interoperability. Within an evolutionary approach, interface management is 
critical to successfully integrating designs across development blocks. This need 
increases for systems with interfaces across platforms or systems-of-systems. In 
contrast to these challenges, an OS approach focuses on explicitly identifying and 
managing key interfaces that can benefit from modular design and open systems as 
a means of improving interoperability.  
The evolutionary acquisition challenge and the open systems method suggest 
that the two acquisition approaches must be integrated and may be synergistic. But 
the complexity of the processes and the requirements of the two approaches make 
their integration, synergy, and successful implementation anything but obvious, easy 
or certain. The requirements of the approaches have been largely identified, and 
some of the changes required in programs for the use of EA and OS together have 
been identified. But a focused study of the impacts of integrating open systems and 
evolutionary acquisition is needed both to identify the impacts on development 
processes and to point to potential program design and management actions in 
order to exploit their potential. How does the use of evolutionary acquisition and 
open systems together impact a system’s development processes and 
management? How do those impacts affect acquisition program performance?  
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The current work partially addresses these issues as follows. The researchers 
review evolutionary acquisition and open systems approaches through the lens of 
their influence on program processes and management. The researchers then use 
the required program changes identified in the existing literature to describe 
challenges to integrating the approaches and to describe specific influences on 
program management. After describing the modeling approach used here and the 
simulation model of an acquisition program, the researchers map the specific 
influences into changes in model variables. They then use the results of simulations 
of the evolutionary acquisition program without and with open systems as a basis for 
a discussion of both the needs for successful programs that use both approaches, 
as well as the use of simulation modeling as a tool for investigating these 
acquisition-implementation issues. The paper closes with recommendations for 
future work.   
Evolutionary Acquisition  
In the year 2000, the Defense Department promulgated the term “evolutionary 
acquisition” (EA) in its policy documents governing the strategy for acquisition of 
materiel and mandated such strategies be used as the preferred approach to 
procurement (USD(AT&L), 2000, October 23). Later elaborated as spiral and 
incremental strategies, these approaches contrast to others that are based on more 
serial, sequential or singular efforts to arrive at a product solution. The latter are 
often termed as: single-step-to-full-capability, grand design, big bang, technological 
leap, waterfall, rational-comprehensive, and the unified development method 
(Forsberg, Mooz, & Cotterman, 2005, p. 354).  The overarching goals and principles 
of the DoD’s evolutionary acquisition are to ensure that the Defense Acquisition 
System provides useful military capability to the operational user as rapidly as 
possible, and such strategies shall be the preferred approach to satisfying 
operational needs. Evolutionary acquisition strategies define, develop, and 
produce/deploy an initial, militarily useful capability ("Block I") based upon proven 
technology, time-phased requirements, projected threat assessments, and 
demonstrated manufacturing capabilities. They also plan for subsequent 
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development and production/deployment of increments beyond the initial capability 
over time (Blocks II, III, and beyond) (USD(AT&L), 2000, October 23). Figure 1 
shows the conceptual difference between a traditional single-step-to-capacity 
acquisition process and an evolutionary acquisition process with two development 
blocks, as described in the 1996 and 2003 versions of DoD 5000 series.   
Technology 
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Figure 1. Comparison of Traditional Single-step-to-capacity  
and Evolutionary Acquisition Approaches  
(Dillard, 2005) 
The policy for evolutionary acquisition was aimed at improving all parameters 
of program success, but clearly and explicitly, its single most important objective was 
to reduce long product cycle-times to deliver operationally useful equipment. Figure 
1 illustrates the hypothetical earlier start of production and the overlapping 
development blocks that are characteristic of evolutionary acquisition. The authors, 
in their previous work (Dillard & Ford, 2007) investigated implementation challenges 
of evolutionary acquisition using the same approach that we are using in the current 
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work. We found, in part, that an evolutionary development approach significantly 
increases the number of development phases and activities that must be managed 
and coordinated at any given time over that required for single-block development. 
This, consequently, increases the organizational project management resource 
needs for successful acquisition over those necessary for single-block projects. 
Using open systems with an evolutionary approach may or may not accentuate 
these challenges.  
Open Systems in DoD Acquisition 
Open Systems were made a part of DoD acquisition in DoD 5000.1 (Under 
Secretary of Defense (AT&L), 2003, May 12a), which says “a modular open systems 
approach shall be employed where feasible” (p. 7). A subsequent memorandum 
(Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), July 7, 2004) clarified the central role of OS in 
acquisition by saying the approach is “an integral part of the toolset that will help 
DoD achieve its goal of providing the joint combat capabilities required in the 21st 
century, including supporting and evolving these capabilities over their total life-
cycle” (p. 8). The Open Systems Joint Task Force (OSJTF) leads the DoD OS effort 
(OSJTF, 2004, September). Several terms defined in that guide are relevant to and 
used in the current work, including:  
 Open architecture: An architecture that employs open standards for 
key interfaces within a system. 
 Open Standards: Standards that are widely used, readily available, 
consensus-based, published and maintained by recognized industry 
standards organizations (versus “closed,” which are not). 
 Open system: A system that employs modular design, uses widely 
supported and consensus-based standards for its key interfaces, and 
has been subjected to successful validation and verification tests to 
ensure the openness of its key interfaces.    
 Open systems environment (OSE): A comprehensive set of 
interfaces, services, and supporting formats, plus aspects of 
interoperability of application, as specified by Information Technology 
(IT) standards and profiles. An OSE enables information systems to be 
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developed, operated, and maintained independent of application-
specific technical solutions or vendor products.  
An open systems approach uses the concepts of key versus non-key 
interfaces and open versus closed interfaces, as defined above, to build flexibility 
into programs. Figure 2 illustrates potential locations of these interfaces in a 
conceptual system with modular subsystems/components. The centrality of these 
concepts to the open systems approach greatly increases the importance of the 
intended and unintended impacts of a shift away from the traditional focus on 
customized designs to integration through open interfaces.  
 
Figure 2. Types of Systems Interfaces  
(OSJFT, 2004) 
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Challenges of Integrating Evolutionary Acquisition 
and Open Systems 
Program managers using open systems and evolutionary acquisition in an 
integrated fashion may be able to achieve interoperability and insert evolving 
technologies better than using either approach alone. But, despite their potential, the 
combination of OS and EA has not yet been fully developed or implemented in DoD 
acquisition. This is perceived to be largely because the issues related to their 
implementation have not been completely identified or resolved. This incomplete 
resolution of the implementation of open systems and evolutionary acquisition 
makes understanding their interactions and the impacts of those interactions on 
acquisition programs difficult.  
The adoption and use of open systems in DoD acquisition requires several 
different activities that impact the acquisition process in different ways. Meyers and 
Oberndorf (2001) identify some of these activities. We describe the most important 
activities identified by Meyers and Oberndorf with our assessment of their impacts 
on the evolutionary acquisition process:  
1. Build a baseline of standards and commercial-off-the-shelf 
(COTS) products. This change increases the scope of the Block 1 
requirements phase and early design (pre-system acquisition) to 
describe the requirements in terms of standards.  
2. Build a high-level model of the system for use in applying the 
open systems approach. This change increases the scope of early 
design in Block 1.  
3. Document the open architecture in a way that shows the 
evaluation of alternative architectures, identifies components, 
technologies, etc. This change increases the scope of the early 
design activities and advanced development phases in all Blocks.  
4. Coordinate standards and establish liaisons with standards 
bodies and users. This change increases the scope of all phases in 
all blocks because it is an on-going process.  
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5. Implement the use of the selected standards in the development 
process. This change decreases the scope of the advanced 
development phase in all blocks due to component design activities 
being replaced with component selection.   
6. Integrate components into the product and test the integrated 
system.  This change increases problems/rework in advanced 
development and manufacturing phases of all blocks.  
Hanratty, Lightsey, and Larson (1999) also investigated the use of open 
systems in acquisition. They describe the impacts of OS on acquisition as a shift 
away from design (which, in OS, is done by the broader commercial market) to an 
integration of elements into products (which, in OS, is increasingly done with 
elements that were not developed specifically for the DoD). Hanratty, Leghtsey, and 
Larson identified several areas of open systems design that pose risks, which we 
describe with our assessment of the primary impacts of OS on evolutionary 
acquisition processes.  
1. Slower integration and testing of standards-based elements into 
products. This change delays the discovery of integration problems 
until later in projects.  
2. Reduced DoD control over standards. This change increases the 
number and size of design problems due to faster evolution of the 
standard used in the product.  
3. Increased standards-selection risk due to evolution of standards 
and the possibility that standards will not endure. This change 
increases the number and size of design problems due to the 
possibility that the selected standard will not endure, and increases 
testing and integration (regardless of whether problems are discovered 
or not) due to more frequent changes in standards.  
4. Increased standard change risk—knowing when to shift from one 
standard to another. This change increases testing and integration 
(regardless of whether problems are discovered or not) due to more 
frequent changes in standards. It also increases the number and size 
of integration problems that need to be discovered and resolved due to 
the need to change to the new standard more often and the possibility 
of changing too early, too late, or to the wrong standard if more than 
one are available (e.g., competing for market dominance).  
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5. Increased and continuous testing requirements due to the need to 
integrate evolving commercial and non-developmental items into 
systems. This change increases testing and integration (regardless of 
whether problems are discovered or not) due to more frequent 
component redesigns.   
6. Development of support concepts early in the acquisition cycle—
causing increased standards-selection risk due to large amounts 
of information needed about currently available standards. This 
change increases standards research and planning early in acquisition, 
which would include increased interface design and management.  
7. Reduced control over detailed component design due to design 
by industry based on industry-controlled standards. This change 
increases the number and size of integration problems due to 
component designs that do not exactly match product needs.  
These specific influences pose significant individual challenges. However, 
they might also interact in ways that are difficult to predict or immediately recognize 
and address. In the Model Use section, we describe how we mapped these 
influences onto specific parts of an acquisition process to better understand how 
they impact program performance.   
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The Research Approach 
Evolutionary acquisition and open systems approaches combine to create a 
complex set of development processes that evolve over time. An improved 
understanding of these processes and their management is available through formal 
modeling of the most important components and relationships that drive system 
performance and risk. Due to the number and complexity of the components and 
their relationships, the formal model structure and rigor of calculations can simulate 
and forecast performance and risk better than informal tacit predictions by humans. 
Therefore, we applied a computational experimentation approach to investigating 
evolutionary acquisition and open systems projects, integrating theory and practice 
in a computational tool that allows controlled experimentation through simulation. 
The current work reflects project, product development, and management theories.  
The system dynamics methodology was applied to model a DoD acquisition 
project with evolutionary processes and open systems. System dynamics uses a 
computational experimentation approach to understanding and improving 
dynamically complex systems. The system dynamics perspective focuses on the 
roles of accumulations and flows, feedback, and nonlinear relationships in 
managerial control. The methodology’s ability to model many diverse system 
components (e.g., work, people, money), processes (e.g., design, technology 
development, quality assurance), and managerial decision-making and actions (e.g., 
forecasting, resource allocation) makes it useful for investigating acquisition projects. 
Forrester (1961) develops the methodology's philosophy, and Sterman (2000) 
specifies the modeling process with examples and describes numerous applications. 
When applied to development projects, system dynamics focuses on how 
performance evolves in response to interactions among development strategy (e.g., 
evolutionary development vs. traditional), managerial decision-making (e.g., scope 
developed in specific blocks), and development processes (e.g., concurrence). 
System dynamics is considered appropriate for modeling acquisition projects 
because of its ability to explicitly model critical aspects of development projects 
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(Ford & Sterman, 1998; Cooper, 1993a,b,c; Cooper & Mullen, 1993; Cooper, 1994). 
System dynamics has been successfully applied to a variety of project management 
issues, including prediction/discovery of failures in project fast-track implementation 
(Ford & Sterman, 2003b), poor schedule performance (Abdel-Hamid 1988), and the 
impacts of changes (Rodriguez & Williams, 1997; Cooper, 1980) and concealing 
rework requirements (Ford & Sterman, 2003a) on project performance. See Lyneis 
and Ford (2007) for a review of the application of system dynamics to projects.  
The simulation model used here is based on previously developed system 
dynamics models of product development in several industries that have been 
developed and tested over several decades, as described and referenced below. 
Therefore, the model is founded on well-established and tested components. 
Previous models have developed structures for many components and aspects of 
acquisition. However, previous models have not been used to investigate the 
integration of EA and OS in acquisition projects. The current model was originally 
developed to investigate EA and is described in detail by Dillard and Ford (2007).   
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A Conceptual Model of an Evolutionary Acquisition 
Program 
The model structure reflects the structure of development work moving 
through the separate development blocks of an acquisition project. In the model, four 
types of work flow through each block of an acquisition project: the development of 
requirements, the development of technologies, the design of product components, 
and the manufacture of products. Within a development block, each type of work 
flows through a development phase that completes a critical aspect of the project: 1) 
develop requirements, 2) develop technologies, 3) design product components 
(advanced development), and 4) manufacture products. The exception is 
requirements, which also measures progress through the final phase, 5) conduct 
user product testing. Development phases and information flows in a single block, as 
depicted in the model, are shown in Figure 3. Arrows between phases indicate 
primary information flows. The start of all phases (except the development of 
requirements) is constrained by the completion of previous (“upstream”) phases. The 
completion of some requirements allows the start of technology development, 
reflecting the concurrent nature of this portion of acquisition. Both requirements 
development and technology development must be completed for Advanced 
Development to begin. The completion of Advanced Development allows 
manufacturing to begin. When some products have been manufactured, they are 
shipped to users for readiness testing. Figure 3 also identifies the five major reviews 
within a single acquisition block (A, B, Design Readiness Review, C, and Full-rate 
Production) at their approximate times during a project. These reviews are 
necessary, but are “off-core” activities that add work beyond that needed to 
complete the basic products of each phase (requirements, technologies, designs, 
products, and readiness for use confirmation).  
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Figure 3. Information Flows in a Single-block Acquisition Project 
Figure 4 depicts an acquisition project with multiple iterations or blocks. The 
first block is the same as Figure 3 above. Subsequent blocks have the same basic 
information flow, but can also be delayed by the completion of phases in previous 
blocks or constrained by the lack of progress in their own block. Importantly, in 
addition to the flow of information downstream through phases (black arrows in 
Figure 4), multiple iteration acquisition also provides opportunities for information to 
flow upstream, such as from User Product Testing in an earlier iteration to Develop 
Requirements or Advanced Development in a subsequent iteration (red vertical 
arrows in Figure 4).  
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Figure 4. Information Flows in a Three-block Acquisition Project 
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A Formal Simulation Model of an Evolutionary 
Acquisition Program  
The conceptual model described above was used to build a formal computer 
simulation model of an acquisition program that can reflect evolutionary acquisition 
and the use of open systems. See Dillard and Ford (2007) for details. The simulation 
model is a system of nonlinear differential equations. Each phase is represented by 
a generic structure, which is parameterized to reflect a specific phase of 
development.  
Project performance is measured in three dimensions: schedule, cost, and 
product-performance risk. Schedule performance is measured in the time required 
for developers and users to produce, test and approve a given number or fraction of 
requirements. Cost is measured in dollars based on the size of direct and indirect 
work forces and the duration of phases and blocks. Product-performance risk is 
measured by the average percent of the requirements provided (approved by users) 
at any given time. This average reflects the combination of multiple requirements. All 
the requirements can be considered met completely when the average percent of 
the requirements provided is 100% for a development block.  
The formal model was calibrated to the Javelin project described by Dillard 
and Ford (2007) based on data collected from a manager on the project (the second 
author) and performance data (e.g., schedule and costs) on the project. The model 
was tested with the three types of tests of system dynamics models suggested by 
Forrester and Senge (1980): structural similarity to the actual system, reasonable 
behavior over a wide range of input values, and behavior similarity to actual 
systems. This model was found to be useful for investigating the impacts of OS and 
EA on acquisition projects.  
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Model Use 
To investigate the impacts of open systems on evolutionary acquisition, we 
simulated a project similar to the Javelin project twice: first as if the project did not 
use open systems and then as if the project used an open systems approach. We 
then compared the behavior and project performance. The program base-case 
model and simulation described in Dillard and Ford (2007) reflects an evolutionary 
acquisition program that does not include open systems impacts. To add the impacts 
of open systems to the model, we first mapped the identified impacts based on 
Meyers and Oberndorf (2001) onto model variables as follows (Table 1):  
Table 1. Impacts of Open Systems on Evolutionary Acquisition Due to 
Changes Suggested by Meyers and Oberndorf (2001) 
Change Required by  
Open Systems Impact on Evolutionary Acquisition Processes 
1) Build standards & COTS 
for program use 
Increases Requirements scope in Block1 
Increases Technology Development scope in Block 1 
2) Build high-level model 
with open systems 
Increases Technology Development scope in Block 1 
3) Document use of OS Increases Technology Development scope in all 
blocks 
4) Coordinate standards Increases scope of all phases in all blocks 
5) Implement OS Decreases Advanced Development scope in all 
blocks 
Fewer Advanced Development design problems in all 
blocks 
6) Integrate components More Advanced Development integration problems in 
all blocks 
More Manufacturing integration problems in all blocks
 
We also mapped the impacts of required changes to acquisition projects 
identified by Hanratty, Lightsey, and Larson (1999) onto model variables as follows 
(Table 2):  
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Table 2. Impacts of Open Systems on Evolutionary Acquisition Due to 
Changes Suggested by Hanratty, Lightsey, and Larson (1999) 
Change Required by Open Systems Impact on Evolutionary Acquisition Processes 
7) Slower integration and testing a1) Reduces problem discovery in 
Technology Development and 
Advanced Development phases in all 
blocks 
a2) Increases problem discovery in 
Manufacturing phases in all blocks 
b1) Decreases problem discovery in 
earlier blocks (all phases except 
Requirements) 
b2) Increases problem discovery in later 
blocks (all phases except 
Requirements) 
8) Track and change with evolving 
standards 
More problems in Advanced 
Development and Manufacturing phases 
in later blocks  
Increases scope in Technology 
Development and Advanced 
Development phases in all blocks 
9) Increase testing to discover increased 
integration problems 
 
Increases scope in Technology 
Development, Advanced Development, 
and Manufacturing phases in all blocks 
10) Build support system (OSE) Increases scope in Requirements phase 
in Block 1 
 
Several of the changes above impact the same portions of an evolutionary 
process, sometimes in the same directions and sometimes in opposite directions. 
Therefore, we regrouped the impacts (Table 3) according to model variables that 
describe specific program blocks and development phase (e.g., scope of work in 
Block 1, Requirements Phase). The three variables found to best describe the 
impacts of open systems on evolutionary acquisition programs are the scope of 
work, rework fraction, and quality assurance (QA) effectiveness. In the table below 
and within the model, the scope represents the work that must be completed in a 
development phase. The Rework Fraction reflects the number of problems that are 
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created in a development phase. The QA effectiveness reflects the difficulty of 
discovering problems to be resolved. The unit of measure of change was chosen as 
the percent change from the base case that the use of open systems would cause. 
This normalizes impacts for different phases (e.g., a change of 10 to a phase with a 
scope of 50 is very large compared to the same change to a phase with a scope of 
5,000) and facilitates assessment of the changes. No known data is available to 
complete Table 3 based on an actual acquisition program. However, order of 
magnitude estimates that are in a reasonable rank order of size are adequate 
because of the preliminary nature of the study. The net changes of all the specific 
influences are summarized in Table 3. See Appendix A for a more detailed 
description of the estimates.  
Table 3. Estimated Changes in Evolutionary Acquisition Processes to 
Reflect Open Systems 






DEVELOPMENT BLOCK 1    
   Requirements +7 0 0  
   Develop Technology  -15 0 -10 
   Advanced Development  -17 -5 -10 
   Manufacturing +2 +5 +5  
   Testing by Users +1 0  -5  
Net Change from Base Case -22% 0% -20%   
 
DEVELOPMENT BLOCK 2 
   
   Requirements +1 0 0   
   Develop Technology  -16 0 -5  
   Advanced Development  -17 0 -5 
   Manufacturing +2 +10 +10 
   Testing by Users +1 0 0  
Net Change from Base Case -29% +10% 0% 
 
DEVELOPMENT BLOCK 3 
   
   Requirements +1  0 0 
   Develop Technology  -16 0 0 
   Advanced Development  -17 +5 0 
   Manufacturing +2 +15 +15 
   Testing by Users +1 0 +5 
Net Change from Base Case  -29 +20 +20 
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Simulation Results  
Figure 5 shows a plot of the simulated percent of project requirements 
provided to users by the acquisition program without open systems (Line 1) and with 
open systems (Line 2). The simulated program has three development blocks, and 
the simulation clearly shows the evolutionary acquisition nature of the program—with 
three increases in requirements provided as each development block is completed. 
The simulation also shows that the program with open systems provides as many or 
more requirements at any point in time than the program without open systems. This 
supports the open systems approach’s claim that it can facilitate providing more 
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Figure 5. Requirement Fulfillment with Evolutionary Acquisition  
without (Line 1) and with (Line 2) Open Systems 
In addition to supporting the potential gains available through evolutionary 
acquisition and open systems, the simulation describes the interaction of 
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for improved understanding. The simulation shows that the improvement in time-to-
requirement increases with each block, indicating that open systems can improve 
this dimension of program performance during multiple development blocks. An 
open systems approach may leverage its benefits when used with 
evolutionary acquisition through repeated capture of benefits generated in 
early development blocks in subsequent development blocks.  If an OS 
approach is implemented with EA, programs may be able to reap the benefits first 
achieved in earlier blocks in subsequent downstream blocks, effectively benefitting 
more than once for the open systems work done early.   
However, time to delivery of requirements is only one measure of program 
performance. Cost is another important performance measure. The simulated 
program without open systems costs $5.39 million through complete release to 
users and the program with open systems costs $3.84 million through complete 
release to users.1. Reduced costs are an established potential benefit of using open 
systems, largely through reduced design scope. This is the case in the model, in 
which a significant reduction in design scope is assumed to be a fundamental impact 
of using open systems. However, the simulation points out an additional potential 
cost benefit of using open systems. Shorter programs tend to cost less (all other 
things held equal). Therefore, open systems can improve cost performance by 
interacting with evolutionary acquisition to enhance the schedule performance 
available through evolutionary acquisition alone.  
A third important performance measure is the quality of the developed 
product. Less-than-desired quality can be caused by many things, including not or 
partially fulfilling requirements, design errors that reduce product performance or 
increase operations or maintenance costs, and integration errors that make future 
upgrades difficult, slow, or expensive. Design and integration errors are particularly 
important in the current work because of their central role in open systems. 
Acquisition program changes required by open systems clearly alter the nature, 
                                            
1 Actual costs may be significantly different due to smaller reductions in design scope.  
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number, and timing of both design and integration errors. Generally, early design 
errors are expected to be reduced, but later integration errors may increase due to 
evolving standards. Errors that are discovered and addressed during an acquisition 
program are not as problematic as those that remain after the product has been put 
into service. Undiscovered and released errors are problematic because they can 
severely increase operations, maintenance, and upgrade costs.  
The model was used to simulate the number of undiscovered errors in 
released work without and with open systems. Figure 6 shows the evolution of the 
number of undiscovered and released errors as a percent of the program scope. In 
general, the number of released errors increases as work is completed, until the next 
development phase begins receiving development work, finding errors, and returning 
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Figure 6. Undiscovered Problems in Evolutionary Acquisition  
without (Line 1) and with (Line 2) Open Systems 
Figure 6 shows that the simulated project with open systems generates and 
fails to find and resolve more errors before release. To further investigate this, the 
errors were disaggregated into design errors and integration errors—based on the 
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and technology development and advanced development) are primarily design 
errors, and errors in manufacturing and testing are primarily integration errors. 
Figure 7 shows the undiscovered and released design errors as a percent of scope 
with and without open systems, and Figure 8 shows the undiscovered and released 
integration errors as a percent of scope with and without open systems. Note that 
the vertical scale in Figure 8 (0-20%) is four times larger than the vertical scale in 
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Figure 7. Undiscovered and Released Design Errors  
in Evolutionary Acquisition  
without (Line 1) and with (Line 2) Open Systems 
The differences in the timing of when design errors are generated, discovered 
and resolved, or missed and released is primarily due to the faster development with 
open systems. More importantly, the total percent of design errors at the completion 
of the program is nearly the same for the two programs. This suggests that the 
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Figure 8. Undiscovered Integration Errors in Evolutionary Acquisition  
without (Line 1) and with (Line 2) Open Systems 
There are at least two important differences between the number of 
undiscovered and released design errors (Figure 7) and the number of undiscovered 
and released integration errors (Figure 8). First, the programs generated and failed 
to resolve three to four times as many integration errors than design errors. This 
suggests that PMs using open systems must address integration issues if they wish 
to succeed.  This finding also supports the importance of the shift from design to 
integration identified by other investigators. Second, the program with open systems 
generated at least 25% more integration errors than the program without open 
systems (3+% more than 13%). This difference in integration errors explains 
essentially the entire difference in total undiscovered and released errors (Figure 6).  
In summary, the simulation results show that open systems can interact with 
evolutionary acquisition to improve the timing of products (Figure 5), reduce 
development costs, and increase the number of undiscovered and released 
integration errors (Figures 6-8). This suggests that open systems and evolutionary 
acquisition can interact to improve schedule and cost performance, but that 
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maintenance, and upgrade costs when the integration errors are eventually 
discovered and must be resolved.  
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Implications for Evolutionary Acquisition Practice 
with Open Systems  
The identification of impacts of open systems on evolutionary acquisition 
programs and the simulation results carry potentially valuable implications for 
acquisition program managers.  
Shifting the Types and Amounts of Risk  
Adding open systems to evolutionary acquisition shifts the program 
management focus from design to standards and integration. This impacts when the 
program accepts and must manage different types and amounts of risk. Open 
systems reduce design risks by designing components, subsystems, and systems to 
be consistent with established standards. Component design risk is also reduced, as 
an OS approach uses pre-designed and pre-tested components that have been 
designed and tested to established standards. Open systems may increase other 
risks, however. Standards-selection and change risks are increased because 
programs using open systems are dependent on standards more than programs 
using customized designs; OS also have little influence over the evolution of those 
standards. Integration risks may increase significantly as standards change over the 
product lifecycle, and new standards may not be compatible with the current design 
of products. Different types of skills are needed to manage different types of risk. For 
example, detailed component-design risk management requires technical expertise 
for design review and component testing, but integration risk management requires 
a broader, systems understanding of the product and how subsystems work together 
to fulfill requirements. Acquisition programs using open systems need a different set 
of risk-management skills than programs not using open systems. Less-detailed 
technical expertise will likely be needed, and more integration and systems expertise 
will be needed. . If open systems are integrated into evolutionary acquisition 
(which repeats the development process over multiple blocks), acquisition 
programs will require significant and extended integration and systems 
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expertise. This will also change the skill sets needed by the DoD acquisition 
workforce.  
A Temporal Shift in Program Risks   
Design risks occur relatively early in programs and product lifecycles, 
whereas integration risks occur relatively late. Therefore, the use of open systems 
will shift program risk to emerge later in projects. The simulations support this result 
with the increase in the number of undiscovered and released integration errors with 
open systems. If costs follow risk, this may result in lower development costs due to 
lower design risk, but higher operating, maintenance, and upgrade costs due to 
higher integration risk. Figure 9 describes the relative costs in a product lifecycle. 
Integration of OS into EA may reduce Research and Development costs when 
programs can capture design benefits, but may increase Operating and Support 
costs when integration and evolving standards risks may increase costs. The sizes 
of these cost changes are uncertain, but the potential for early reductions in cost and 
later increases in cost are real.  
 
Figure 9. Relative Costs during a Product Lifecycle  
(Defense Acquisition University, 2004, November, p. 43) 
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By stretching acquisition across multiple blocks, evolutionary 
acquisition may accentuate the impacts of a temporal shift in program risk. 
Therefore, if using open systems causes this temporal shift in risks, then 
programs integrating open systems and evolutionary acquisition may 
experience an increase in the relative size of product costs during use.  
Trading Design Obsolescence for Integration Obsolescence 
Traditional acquisition processes commit programs to customized designs 
and, therefore, bear significant design obsolescence risk when threats and 
technologies evolve away from the design. An open systems approach can reduce 
that risk by allowing the use of more plug-and-play components that can be replaced 
with improved components that meet the chosen standard. However, by using open 
systems, a program must also commit to one or more standards early in 
development and, therefore, bear significant standards obsolescence risk if and as 
standards evolve away from the needs of the program and as integration problems 
increase. Evolutionary acquisition’s need for integration across multiple 
development blocks can increase the impact of open systems on 
obsolescence risk. Adding open systems to evolutionary acquisition may 
cause programs to trade away design risk for increased integration risk.  
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Conclusions 
The current work has extended and expanded the descriptions of the impacts 
of using open systems and evolutionary acquisition together on development 
processes and management. We then mapped those impacts into a computer 
simulation model and used that model to investigate how open systems and 
evolutionary acquisition interact. Results include that the changes required to 
implement open systems in evolutionary acquisition significantly impact development 
processes and management, particularly scopes of design, standards, and 
integration work, the generation of different types of problems, and the timing of the 
discovery of problems. The shift from a focus on design to a focus on integration 
was found to be particularly important. Simulation reinforced the potential for open 
systems to accelerate acquisition and revealed a potentially important distinction 
between design and integration errors in explaining the impacts of required changes. 
Implications for practice included shifts in the type and timing of risks due to open 
systems use and the possibility of trading design obsolescence for integration 
obsolescence.  
This research has contributed to the understanding of open systems and 
evolutionary acquisition in several ways. The work improved the description and 
specification of impacts of acquisition policy on acquisition practice. The work also 
used dynamic computer simulation to model and investigate open systems and to 
model evolutionary acquisition and open systems together, both for the first time to 
our knowledge. The results of the simulation reinforced several suggested impacts 
of open systems and provided additional causal rational behind why suggested 
impacts may occur. These rationales were the basis of potential implications for the 
evolutionary acquisition practice with open systems. The reasoning provided based 
on the computer simulation can be used to extend and deepen decision-makers’ 
understanding of open systems and evolutionary acquisition and the design of 
program processes and management.   
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Future researchers can improve and extend the work described here by 
gathering additional data about the use of open systems with evolutionary 
acquisition in practice and, in so doing, testing the existence and importance of 
suggested impacts. The similarity of the model and, thereby, confidence in results 
can be improved by using additional acquisition projects that use both evolutionary 
acquisition and open systems.2 Finally, additional recommendations for practice can 
be developed based upon the model developed here and elsewhere. These 
investigations can further develop the understanding of how to effectively integrate 
open systems and evolutionary acquisition and, consequently, improve the systems 
and products provided to warfighters. 
                                            
2 The authors are currently working with a large navy acquisition project to do this.  
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Appendix A. Mapping Specific Influences of Open 
Systems onto Evolutionary Acquisition Programs’ 
Processes  
The researchers estimated the impact of each specific, identified and 
described influence on the scope of work, rework fraction, and quality assurance 
(QA) effectiveness. They measured the scope of work by the number of equal-sized 
work packages that must be completed in a development phase. They measured the 
rework fraction with the percent of those work packages that require changes; this 
measurement reflects the number of problems that are created in a development 
phase. They measured the QA effectiveness with the fraction of the work packages 
needing rework that are discovered to need rework. Although no known data is 
available as a basis for the estimated changes, order of magnitude estimates that 
are in a reasonable rank order of size are adequate because of the preliminary 
nature of the study. To facilitate mapping of the specific influences listed in the text 
to model changes, the researchers listed the specific influences after the individual 
impacts on each model parameter in parenthesis.  
Table 3. Detailed Estimate of Changes in Evolutionary Acquisition Processes 
to Reflect Open Systems 
Program Block  Scope    Rework QA  
and Phase    of Work   Fraction  Effectiveness  
DEVELOPMENT BLOCK 1 
   Requirements   +1+1+5 (1,4,10)   0   0  
   Develop Technology   +1+1+1-20 +1+1(1,2,3,5,8,9) 0   -5 -5 (7a,7b) 
   Advanced Development   +1-20 +1+1 (4,5,8,9)  -10 +5(5,6) -5 -5 (7a,7b) 
   Manufacturing   +1 +1(4,9)   +5 (6)  +10 -5 (7a,7b) 
   Testing by Users  +1 (4)    0   -5 (7b)  
Net Change in Base Case -22    0  -20   
 
DEVELOPMENT BLOCK 2 
   Requirements   +1 (4)    0  0   
   Develop Technology   +1+1 -20+1+1 (3,4,5,8,9)  0  -5 (7a) 
   Advanced Developoment +1-20 +1+1 (4,5,8,9)  -10 +5 +5(5,6,8) -5 (7a) 
   Manufacturing   +1 +1(4,9)   +5 +5 (6,8) +10 (7a) 
   Testing by Users  +1 (4)    0  0  
Net Change in Base Case -29    +10  0  
 
DEVELOPMENT BLOCK 3 
   Requirements   +1 (4)    0  0 
   Develop Technology   +1+1-20+1+1 (3,4,5,8,9)  0  -5 +5 (7a,7b) 
   Advanced Development   +1-20+1 +1(4,5,8,9)  -10 +5+10 (5,6,8) -5 +5 (7a,7b) 
   Manufacturing   +1+1 (4,9)   +5 +10 (6,8) +10 +5 (7a,7b) 
   Testing by Users  +1 (4)    0  +5 (7b) 
Net Change in Base Case  -29    +20  +20  
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